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The slow economic recovery since the 2008 financial crisis and Great Recession 
requires state and local governments to continue to make difficult decisions concerning 
which taxes to raise and which expenditures to decrease in order to maintain a balanced 
budget. As expenditures usually raise economic growth and taxes generally hinder it, 
seeking the optimum combination of tax structures and expenditure options is necessary 
to encourage prosperity in a state.  In this paper I study the effects of various 
expenditures and revenue combinations on growth in state personal income from 1977-
2010 for 49 states and the District of Columbia.  I find that state and local governments 
overfund education and parks, recreation, and natural resources while they underfund 
hospitals and health spending, once netted for charges.  Corporate Income Taxes are 
underutilized as a source of revenue.  I also estimate growth hills and find evidence in 
support thereof.   (JEL E62, H21, H70, O40, R11) 
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Section I - Introduction 
The slow economic recovery since the 2008 financial crisis and Great Recession 
requires state and local governments to continue to make difficult decisions concerning 
which taxes to raise and which expenditures to decrease in order to maintain a balanced 
budget.  Taxation divorces the price the seller receives from the price the buyer pays and, 
thus, causes distortions in market activity and dead-weight loss in the economy. At the 
same time, the private economy underprovides public goods.  Higher taxes provide a 
higher level of public expenditure, which may foster economic growth.  This study 
considers maintaining the optimum combination of tax structures and expenditure options 
to encourage prosperity in a state. 
This paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal structures, including specific 
taxes and specific spending categories, and growth in real per capita personal income 
from 1977 to 2010.  Key to this paper is the investigation into the effects of specific taxes 
and expenditures on growth.  Since revenue minus spending equals the surplus, perfect 
multicollinearity occurs.  This requires a regression to include all fiscal variables, except 
one.  The coefficients are then interpreted as the effect on the growth rate of an increase 
in the independent variable caused by an appropriate offset of the omitted variable.  For 
example, I compare the effect of raising corporate taxes or raising the deficit to fund 
more education spending, and so on.  I then do this, in turn, for all structures.  This 
enables the study to answer the question of which fiscal sources and expenditures the 
government over- or under-uses, for the average state. 
 As first noted in Bania, Gray and Stone (2007), focusing on linear incremental 
effects does not allow for decreasing returns to expenditure increases.  When 
expenditures first increase they provide public goods enhancing economic growth.  Once 
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privately under-provided public goods are sufficiently apportioned, additional 
government expenditure will crowd out the private economy, and therefore reduce 
growth.  I will also incorporate squared fiscal variables to estimate these “growth hills”. 
 Last, I estimate the long-run effects.  Using five-year intervals I estimate 
differenced variables as well as lagged variables.  An added benefit to this is 
measurement error and serial correlation are reduced when the observations are further 
apart. 
The object of this paper is to investigate what fiscal structures increase economic 
growth.  The reader must keep in mind that there are other factors that affect fiscal policy.  
An example is providing public goods at the level that the public desires. 
I find that, on average, reducing state and local governments’ revenues and 
expenditures enhance growth.  Governments overfund education and parks, recreation, 
and natural resources while they underfund hospitals and health spending, once netted for 
charges.  I find evidence in support of growth hills and estimate the optimal level of 
government expenditure to be between 18 and 30 percent of the economy, unless if used 
for unproductive expenditures, which do not enhance economic growth at any point.  
When estimating the long-run effect, I find continued evidence for additional government 
spending to be growth diminishing.  Furthermore, I find that corporate income taxes are 
an underutilized source of revenue. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  The second section discusses the literature up to 
this point.  The third section develops a theoretical framework by which to estimate the 
relationship between tax and spending vehicles on growth in state income.  The fourth 
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section discusses the data and estimation methodology.  The fifth section presents the 




Section II - Overview of Previous Research 
The literature offers few conclusions as to the effects of taxes on economic 
growth.  Most conclude that taxes used to fund transfer payments exert small, negative 
effects on economic activity.  If used for productive purposes, oft times tax increases 
increase economic growth: Helms (1985); Phillips and Goss (1995); Miller and Russek 
(1997), Wasylenko (1997), and Bania, Gray and Stone (2007).  Other studies, however, 
show a negative effect on growth: Mullen and Williams (1994); Besci (1996); Reed 
(2008).  Even other studies show a weak effect of taxes on growth: Romans and 
Subrahmanyan (1979); Wasylenko and McGuire 1985); Stokey and Rebelo (1995);  
Lucas Jr. (1990); Tomljanovich (2004).  Most studies focus on the overall tax burden, 
they do not study in great detail separate taxes and spending vehicles. 
Helms (1985) is the first paper to incorporate a budget constraint.  Spending must 
equal revenues plus deficit.  This allows him to separate the effect of overall taxation and 
expenditure into subcategories.  Without including multiple expenditure options, 
researchers must interpret the effects on growth as the effect of raising a tax to finance 
average expenditures.  Helm’s approach allows analyzing the different effects from 
raising a tax to finance, for example, transfer payments or education.  Helms uses logged 
real state personal income as the dependent variable.  The explanatory variables are the 
revenues and expenditures.  The revenue variables include property taxes, other taxes, 
user fees, and federal source revenues.  The spending variables include health, highways, 
local schools, higher education, and other expenditures.  Helms omits the transfer 
payments variable.  He finds positive effects from raising public service expenditure 
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financed by lowering transfer payments, and negative effects of raising taxes to increase 
transfer payments. 
Mofidi and Stone (1990) study the effects of tax burden and expenditures on 
investment and employment.  Like Helms, they omit transfer payments and find that 
transfers have a negative effect. Expenditures on health, education, and infrastructure 
have positive effects. Expanding the selection of fiscal variables even further Miller and 
Russek (1997), using fixed effects, investigated the effects of tax and expenditure 
structures on state GDP from 1978-92. They find that government overuses sales taxes 
and under uses corporate income taxes.  Negative relationships between growth and 
education, transportation, and public safety are reported.  
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) show, under most circumstances, a consumption tax 
does not affect the return on capital and, thus, does not affect investment, output and 
productivity.  They also show that property taxation lowers the return on reproducible 
physical capital and on non-reproducible land.  Therefore, increases in property tax rates 
that lower the return on capital will reduce growth. 
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) distinguish between distortionary taxes 
defined as taxes on income and property, and non-distortionary taxes which include 
consumption taxes.  They conclude that while the former reduces growth, the latter does 
not.  Additionally, they find that productive government spending benefits growth. 
Similarly, Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz (2006) use annual data and take into account 
short-run dynamics and confirm the findings of Kneller, et al. 
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Widmalm (2001) finds that the proportion of tax revenues raised from taxing 
personal income negatively correlates with growth.  Moreover, she documents a tendency 
for consumption taxes to enhance growth. 
Brown, Hayes and Taylor (2003) study the effects of taxation and expenditure for 
state and local governments across states for the years 1977 to 1997.  Using a one-year 
lag structure for the fiscal variables, they find corporate taxes to be underutilized, sales 
and property taxes to be over utilized.  They also find welfare spending to enhance 
growth if funded by corporate income taxes, but to diminish growth if funded by sales 
taxes.  They find both elementary and higher education to be overfunded.  Additional 
health and hospital spending diminish growth in state GDP if funded by sales or property 
taxes.  Transportation and housing both grow the economy if income taxes fund them. 
Yamarik (2000) using pooled OLS to estimate the effects of taxes on state GDP 
from 1977 to 1995 finds the average tax rate to have a significantly negative relationship.  
Specifically he concludes that marginal personal income and average property taxes have 
negative relationships with growth.  In a later paper, Ojede and Yamarik (2012) estimate 
long-run and short-run relationships using pooled mean group estimators.  Welfare 
expenditure is left out of the equation.  Their short-run findings include a negative effect 
on growth if expenditures or property taxes are raised with the appropriate coinciding 
response from welfare payments.  Raising the deficit to pay for welfare expenditures 
exhibits a positive effect on growth.  In the long run, state and local expenditures 
demonstrates a positive relationship with growth if raised by lowering welfare payments.  
Deficit, sales tax, and property tax financing of welfare payments all show a negative 
effect on growth. 
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Recently, Reed (2008) in a thorough and robust study, examined growth across 
states from 1970 to 1999.  Using five-year differences, he consistently finds a negative 
effect of the tax burden on state economic growth.  He estimates under different time 
periods, different geographical regions, and various estimation techniques.  In imitating 
Helm’s style, but contrary to his findings, Reed finds that raising total taxes to fund non-
welfare expenditure exerts a negative effect on growth both in the long run and short run.  





Section III - Theoretical Model 
This paper employs an adaptation of the Bania, Gray, and Stone (2007) and 
Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller (2001) presentation of the public-policy endogenous 
growth model from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).  In the model, fiscal policy can 
determine both the level of the output path and the steady-state growth rate. This differs 
from the neoclassical growth model, which only allows for fiscal policy to affect the level 
of the output path.  The production process involves, n producers, each producing output, 
y,  
(1)             
 
    
 ,  
where A is a positive constant, k is private capital and    is a group of publicly provided 
inputs, and α is a parameter between zero and one.  State and local governments fund its 
budget with a proportional tax on output at the rate   , a group of tax rates (sales, 
property, income, other).  Thus, the budget constraint is presented as 
(2)     
 
       
 
           
 
   , 
where    is a group of government-provided consumption (or “non-productive”) goods 
and b is the budget surplus.  A utility function, for the representative, infinite-lived 
household is given as,  
(3)                         
 
 
            
where the marginal utility has a constant elasticity – θ, c is consumption per person, and 
ρ>0 is the constant rate of time preference.  Households hold real assets, a(t), the real rate 
of return on these assets is denoted by r(t).  The household’s budget constraint determines 
the change over time in assets to be 
(4)           . 
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The first-order condition for maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint requires 
the real rate of return to be 
(5)         , 
where    is the growth rate of consumption per person. 
Firms seek to maximize net revenues.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) show the 
first-order optimization condition includes the relationship 
(6)         
 
             , 
where       is the marginal product of capital and η is the constant cost of capital.  I 
calculate the constant growth rate of the per capita consumption by combining equations 
(5) and (6) 
(7)           
 
                  . 
The growth rate of c is equal to the growth rate of y as long as the appropriate 
transversality conditions are met.  The marginal product of capital is determined from 
equation (1) 
(8)                  
 
       
 
  
This can be transformed into 
(9)             
     
         
 
    
      
        . 
Eventually, by more algebraic manipulation, the equation becomes 
(10)             
 
        
 
       
 
   . 
Finally, plugging this into equation (7), the growth rate of the economy, V, is 
(11)          
 
          
            
 
       
       
  , 
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where       and     .  Private capital is endogenously determined in the model, 
and therefore, does not appear in equation (11).  Output growth in the steady state 
depends only on structural parameters for production and utility w, m, α, and A, the tax 
rates, τ, and the ratio of productive government expenditures to output,     
 
      . 
 For empirical testing, suppose that growth,    , at time t in state s is a function of, 
    , the fiscal variables from equation (2),   , state fixed effects (which control for time-
invariant characteristics such as culture, geography, natural amenities, distance from 
markets, and time-invariant government regulation),   , time fixed effects (which control 
for macroeconomic forces and federal government activity), and,    , the unemployment 
rate, which allows for the finding that regional variation in unemployment rates can be 
persistent and explained in equilibrium Neumann and Topel (1991).  That is, 
(12)              
 
                 . 
In practice, this equation is similar to the reduced form equation found in Brown, Hayes, 
and Taylor (2003).  The linear budget constraint in (2) indicates that 
(13)            
   
   . 
Hence, one fiscal variable must be omitted.  Equation (12) then becomes, 
(14)                   
   
                 . 
The interpretation of the fiscal coefficients should be the effect of a unit change in the 
variable offset by the corresponding change in the omitted variable from the regression.  
For example, if corporate income taxes are omitted, the coefficient for welfare, 
unemployment, and housing are interpreted as the expected increase in the growth rate 
due to a one unit increase in welfare, unemployment, and housing spending funded by the 
corporate income tax. 
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Section IV - Data 
Personal income for each state and the District of Columbia, population, and 
fiscal variables for each state come from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census’ Government Finances database.  Unemployment rates for each state come from 
the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Real per capita personal 
income is calculated using the national GDP deflator, as state level price indices are 
unreliable for the years studied. 
The Census did not collect data for local finances and consequently state & local 
finances for the years 2001 and 2003.  It did, however, collect state data for these two 
years.  Using these data, I interpolate the state and local fiscal variables by estimating the 
following equation, 
(15)                      
         
where S&L is the state and local fiscal variable, State is the state fiscal variable, u is the 
unemployment rate, t is time, φ are state fixed-effects, and e is the error term.  The 




The dependent variable is defined as                       where y is real per 
capita personal income.  Use of per capita measurement is consistent with Yamarik 
(2000); Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001); Bania, Gray and Stone (2007); Miller and 
Russek (1997); Reed ( 2008).  Dividing personal income by population allows the 
coefficients to measure the effect of differences in growth not caused by population 
increases, and can be a proxy for quality of life increases. 
                                                          
1




I study the fiscal variables both at an aggregate level and a disaggregated level.  
The aggregate variables are total revenue, total expenditure, net intergovernmental 
revenue (intergovernmental revenue minus intergovernmental expenditure), and surplus. 
Net intergovernmental revenue can be thought of federal taxes brought back to the state.   
The disaggregated revenue variables are property taxes, sales taxes (which includes sale 
of property, but excludes the public utility sales tax), individual income tax, corporate 
income tax, and other revenues.  The expenditure variables are police, fire, and correction 
facilities; transportation; higher education; secondary education; hospitals and health; 
parks, recreation, and natural resources; welfare, housing and community, and 
unemployment expenditures; and other expenditures.  Net utility expenditures are also 
included
2
.  In Government Finance, public transit is categorized in the total utilities.  In 
my analysis, I move it to the transportation section.  Solid waste and sewerage services 
are self-classified.  I include these expenditures in utilities.   
Because this paper addresses the issue of the effects of tax distortion, revenue 
charges are netted out.  For instance, parks and recreation charges include revenues 
gathered from the use of facilities operated by the government (swimming pools, 
community recreation centers, museums, etcetera) U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006).  
These revenue streams are not distortionary
3
.  Therefore, in evaluating the effect of tax 
collection to provide public services, the corresponding charges must be removed from 
the expenditure.  The remaining portion of the expenditure is financed by different 
revenue sources.  The charges recorded by the Census are air transportation, highways, 
water transportation, parking, education, hospital, parks and recreation, natural resources, 
                                                          
2
 Utilities are net expenditures are positive for 65% of the observations. 
3
 Assuming the charge is equal to the marginal cost of providing the service. 
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housing and community, and other charges.  In addition, utility revenues and liquor store 
revenues are subtracted from their respective expenditures.  Brown, Hayes and Taylor 
(2003) incorporate net utilities and subtract tuition from education, but they do not do this 
for all applicable variables.  They also include total charges and tuition as separate 
revenue variables. The disadvantage of this is that it allows tuition to be spent on other 
expenditures.  In reality, if the state did not provide education, tuitions would not be 
collected.  My approach of netting charges from expenditure is unique in the literature.  
More information on fiscal variable series is given in the appendix. 
I divide the fiscal variables by state personal income and multiply them by 100.  
Therefore, they can be thought of as “effective average tax rates” in a state (Helms, 
1985).  The descriptive statistics for each variable for all observations is given in table 1.  
 The growth rate has averaged 1.94% and ranges from -14.54% (Wyoming in 
2009) to 17.64% (North Dakota in 1981).  The unemployment rate has averaged 6.61%.  
Total revenue average 18.23 percent of state personal income.  Tennessee in 2009 has the 
minimum observation at 10.08% and Wyoming in 2001 has the maximum at 43.62%.  
Total expenditure ranges from 10.71% (North Dakota in 1985) to 32.38% (D.C. in 1977).  
It averages 17.46%.  Sales taxes are the principle form of revenue (3.54%) and property 
taxes are a close second (3.11%).  Secondary education is the largest single expenditure 
(4.27%).  Welfare, unemployment compensation, and housing and community 
expenditure is second (3.36%). The means by state are presented in appendix 2. 
 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 1977-2010 




Growth 1.94 2.61 -14.54 17.64 
Unemployment Rate 6.61 2.19 2.30 19.30 
Total Revenue 18.23 3.56 10.08 43.62 
Total Expenditure 17.46 3.16 10.71 32.38 
Net Intergov. Revenue 4.08 1.64 1.77 17.86 
Surplus 4.86 2.74 -3.43 28.70 
Property Tax 3.11 1.10 0.97 8.42 
Sales Tax 3.54 1.14 0.70 7.47 
Indiv. Income Tax 2.03 1.15 0.00 4.93 
Corp. Income Tax 0.41 0.24 0.00 1.36 
Other Revenue 9.15 3.09 1.84 36.08 
Net Utility Expenditure 0.13 0.42 -0.64 5.50 
Police, Fire, Correction Facilities 1.34 0.45 0.62 4.92 
Transportation 1.78 0.79 -0.64 11.07 
Higher Education 1.08 0.38 0.16 2.74 
Secondary Education 4.27 0.69 2.56 8.65 
Health & Hospital 0.79 0.33 -0.21 2.78 
Parks, Recreation, Natural Resources 0.51 0.23 0.13 1.70 
Welfare, Unemployment, Housing & 
Community 
3.36 1.23 0.94 8.82 
Other Expenditure 4.20 1.10 1.58 9.57 
 
Pre- and post-financial crisis 
The Great Recession began with the financial crisis in autumn of 2008.  In tables 
2 and 3, I investigate the difference in government fiscal activity from before and after 
the crisis.  The Census Classification Manual defines a year to be “each individual 
government fiscal year that ended between July 1 of the previous year and June 30 of the 
survey year.”  Table 2 has the average descriptive statistics for 2007 and 2008.  Table 3 
displays them for 2009 and 2010. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 2007-2008 




Growth 2.05 1.92 -2.18 9.94 
Unemployment Rate 4.93 1.07 2.40 7.70 
Total Revenue 19.41 3.85 12.88 29.87 
Total Expenditure 18.38 2.57 13.76 26.09 
Net Intergov. Revenue 4.45 1.62 2.14 11.24 
Surplus 5.48 3.56 -0.58 16.65 
Property Tax 3.09 0.98 1.38 5.26 
Sales Tax 3.54 1.18 0.70 6.04 
Indiv. Income Tax 2.30 1.19 0.00 4.89 
Corp. Income Tax 0.44 0.27 0.00 1.36 
Other Revenue 10.04 3.58 3.76 20.52 
Net Utility Expenditure 0.06 0.29 -0.64 1.51 
Police, Fire, Correction Facilities 1.50 0.32 0.92 2.59 
Transportation 1.61 0.49 0.79 3.73 
Higher Education 1.07 0.40 0.16 2.32 
Secondary Education 4.43 0.53 3.43 5.63 
Health & Hospital 0.84 0.30 0.30 1.92 
Parks, Recreation, Natural Resources 0.51 0.26 0.13 1.62 
Welfare, Unemployment, Housing & 
Community 
3.98 1.09 2.27 7.43 





Table 3: Summary Statistics 2009-2010 




Growth -2.30 4.28 -14.54 6.23 
Unemployment Rate 8.84 2.12 4.80 14.50 
Total Revenue 16.30 3.08 10.08 29.10 
Total Expenditure 20.60 2.80 15.31 28.76 
Net Intergov. Revenue 5.42 1.66 2.54 10.01 
Surplus 1.11 2.63 -3.30 9.59 
Property Tax 3.41 1.06 1.60 5.78 
Sales Tax 3.45 1.08 0.78 5.70 
Indiv. Income Tax 2.06 1.10 0.00 4.93 
Corp. Income Tax 0.32 0.21 0.00 1.16 
Other Revenue 7.05 2.81 1.84 18.06 
Net Utility Expenditure 0.05 0.22 -0.62 0.86 
Police, Fire, Correction Facilities 1.63 0.38 0.97 2.59 
Transportation 1.78 0.60 0.96 4.25 
Higher Education 1.15 0.48 0.27 2.74 
Secondary Education 4.73 0.62 3.63 6.80 
Health & Hospital 0.20 0.18 -0.21 0.78 
Parks, Recreation, Natural Resources 0.53 0.27 0.16 1.70 
Welfare, Unemployment, Housing & 
Community 
5.04 1.19 2.74 8.82 
Other Expenditure 5.49 1.10 3.68 8.39 
 
The mean of the growth rate of real per capita personal income completely 
reversed, from a 2.05% to -2.30%.  The unemployment rate doubled from 4.93% to 
8.84%.  Revenues decreased from 19.41% of personal income to 16.30%.  At the same 
time, expenditures increased from 18.38% to 20.60%.  This results in the surplus 
dropping from 5.48% to state personal income to just 1.11%.  Interestingly, for a 
recession starting with the bursting a housing a bubble, property taxes rose from 3.09% to 
3.41%, indicating the drop in total property tax revenue to be less than the drop in state 
personal income.  Sales taxes remained mostly unchanged, while the income taxes 
decreased modestly.  
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On the expenditure side, net utilities remained constant as a share of personal 
income.  Police, fire, and correction facilities, transportation, education, and parks, 
recreation, and natural resources increased modestly.  Health and hospital decreased 76% 
from a share of 0.84% to 0.20%.  Welfare, unemployment compensation, and housing 
and community spending increased dramatically from 3.98% to 5.04%. 
Estimation 
The theoretical model suggests that some revenues and expenditures are 
distortionary while others are not.  Rather than judging a priori the nature of each 
variable, I will omit each variable in turn.  It should be noted, because of collinearity that 
each of these regressions are, in essence, the same regression.   
The study covers the years 1977 to 2010 over 49 states
4
 and the District of 
Columbia.  This makes 1700 observations.  (The data for the personal income includes 
1976).  Because the personal income data run over the calendar year, and the budget data 
run over the fiscal year, there is an implied six month lag in the regression.  I ran the 
estimates with a year (i.e. year and a half) lag and the results were not overly sensitive to 
the change. 
Regressions are run in a two way fixed effect model with robust panel-corrected 
standard errors.  I first estimate the aggregated equation to test the level of overall 
spending and revenues.  Next, I follow with the disaggregated equation.  I then estimate 
growth hills for both the aggregate and disaggregate equations.  Last, I estimate long-run 
effects for both the aggregate and disaggregate fiscal variables.   
The estimated equation for growth hills is as follows, 
                                                          
4
 Alaska is omitted due to the extreme nature of their government’s fiscal behavior, much of which is due to 
the pipeline built in 1977. 
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(16)                      
                    . 
Each fiscal variable is left out, in turn, for each regression.  The squared term of net 
intergovernmental revenue is insignificant and the point estimate close to zero, therefore I 




Section V – Results 
Table 4 presents the results from the aggregated estimation.  Unemployment has 
an expected negative significant effect on growth.  For each additional percentage rise in 
the unemployment rate, growth is expected to slow by -0.16%.  Higher total revenue and 
higher total expenditure are shown to have a negative impact on growth.  The exception 
is when revenue is raised to increase the surplus.  This indicates that state and local 
governments raise too much and spend too much, on average.  From theory, this would 
indicate that the average state spends too much on unproductive expenditures.  Another 
possibility, noted by Miller and Russek (1997), is total expenditure and total revenue 
have less cyclical volatility than personal income, implying that cyclical effects cause the 
negative correlation.  There are two things to keep in mind concerning these results.  
First, I only look at what will affect economic growth in per capita income, and not the 
public’s desired level of public good provision.  Second, these results can only be 
interpreted in a broad sense; it does not give us information on which particular 
government activities are growth diminishing. 
The coefficients in tables 4, 5, and 6 are symmetric.  For example, in the first 
column of table 4, when a state raises total expenditure by one percent of state personal 
income, the only way to do so is by raising total revenue. The growth rate of the economy 
is expected to decrease by -0.43 percentage points.  In the second column, when one 
increases revenues by one percent of the share in personal income, again, the only way to 
do so is by raising total expenditure by the same.  It is the same phenomena being 
measured from the other side of the coin and, hence, will have the same coefficient.  
When a pair of fiscal structures are both revenues or are both expenditures, the signs will 
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be opposite.  When one is a revenue, and the other an expenditure, the sign remains the 
same.  
 Tables 5 and 6 display the disaggregated results.  Again, unemployment has a 
significant negative effect.  Parks, recreation, and natural resource spending appear to 
have the most drastic effect.  13 out of the 15 fiscal tradeoffs possible are found to have a 
significant effect on growth in state personal income.  Funding it by any source of 
revenue uniformly brings a negative effect.  The significant effects range from a -1.79% 
(property taxes) decrease in growth to -2.01% (other revenues).  Increasing spending 
elsewhere by lowering spending on parks, recreation, and natural resources produces 
growth enhancements from 1.11% (secondary education) to 2.54% (hospitals).  The 
implication of these findings is that spending on parks, etcetera does not add to the 
growth in income.  This does not imply that spending on parks is bad policy, but 
illustrates the economic tradeoff that exists.  
 
Table 4: The Effect of Aggregate Expenditure and Revenue on State 










Unemployment Rate -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
Total Revenue   -0.43*** 0.18 0.31***   
Total Expenditure -0.43***   -0.62*** -0.75***   
Net Intergov. 
Revenue 
-0.18 -0.62***   0.13 
Surplus 0.31*** 0.75*** 0.13                  
Constant  9.78***  9.78***  9.78***  9.78*** 









Higher education has 11 fiscal tradeoffs that are found to be negatively 
significant.  All 11 have effects greater than one percent.  Funding hospitals instead of 
higher education expects a 2.13% increase in growth.  Increasing funding for higher 
education by way of the corporate income tax has the smallest effect (-1.18%).  
Increasing secondary education expenditure also has a negative effect, ranging from         
-0.69% (property taxes) to 1.43% (hospitals).  Secondary education is preferred to parks, 
recreation, and natural resources (-1.11%).  The evidence suggests that education 
financed by taxes is overfunded, for the average state
5
.  This agrees with the findings of 
Brown, Hayes and Taylor (2003) and Miller and Russek (1997), but contrary to Mofidi 
and Stone (1990) and Helms (1985).  This may be due to a lack of correlation between 
the quality of education and the money spent on education.  Furthermore, Miller and 
Russek (1997) suggest that it may be due to a disincentive for states to invest in human 
capital.  “Better to let someone else exhaust resources on education and then hire the 
improved product away.”  Because education spending may not affect personal income in 
the short run, the long-term effects of education spending will be explored later in this 
paper. 
Contrary to the findings of Brown, et al. but agreeing with Helm’s findings, 
spending on health and hospitals increases growth.  My variable differ from these two 
previous studies in that government spending is net the charges hospitals receive either 
from individuals, or, as most likely the case, from insurance companies.  11 of the 
combinations are statistically significant.  They range from 0.53% (other revenue) to        
-2.54% (parks, etcetera). 
                                                          
5
 To test the theory whether too many “buildings” were being built, the calculations were also made using 
education minus capital outlays.  The coefficients for higher education were slightly less negative, while 
the coefficients for secondary education were slightly more negative. 
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Increasing the budget surplus indicates a benefit to growth in state personal 
income.  Increasing net utility expenditure also shows positive effects.  Both variables are 
consistently statistically significant for 11 combinations.  The coefficients for 
surplus/utilities range from 0.29%/0.46% (other revenue) to -2.30%/-2.47% (parks, 
etcetera). 
The last expenditure to show mostly consistent results, is transportation with nine 
significant fiscal tradeoffs.  Publicly provided transportation is overfunded.  However, 
spending on transportation is preferred over parks, etcetera (-1.30%).  The other 
coefficients range from -0.49% (property taxes) to 1.24% (health and hospitals).  
The rest of the variables display mixed results.  Welfare, unemployment, and 
housing & community expenditures shows to be a more growth enhancing than higher 
education (-1.16%), parks, etcetera (-1.57%), but not to utilities (0.90%), health (0.97%), 
and the surplus (0.73%).  This implies that subsidizing health spending is a more growth 
effective way to assist than direct welfare, unemployment, or housing subsidies.  The 
revenue options were all negative with two significant at the 1% level and two others 
significant with a one-tail test. 
Growth Hills 
In an effort to explain the variety of econometric results for the effect of taxation 
on economic growth among the literature, Bania, Gray and Stone (2007) explain that all 
could be accurate according to Barro-style growth models.  According to this model, 
taxes can have a negative, none, or a positive effect on growth.  The effect relies on the 
initial level of taxes and how the tax revenues are spent.  When taxes are low, revenue 
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increases spent on productive expenditure will exhibit a positive effect on growth.  When 
taxes are high this effect may turn negative. 
The theory differentiates between productive and nonproductive expenditures in 
their effect on economic growth.  Rather than judging a priori which expenditures are 
productive and which not, I will incorporate the findings from tables 5 and 6.  I define 
nonproductive expenditure as parks, recreation, and natural resources; higher education; 
secondary education; welfare, unemployment, and housing & community; and 
transportation.  Productive is defined by hospital; net utility; police, fire, and corrections 
facilities; and other expenditures.  Table 7 displays the results. 












Unemployment Rate -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.16***  -0.15*** -0.15***   
Total Revenues   0.49** -0.44***  0.66** 1.01***   
Total Revenues 
Squared   -0.013*** -0.01** -0.016*** -0.02***   
Productive 
Expenditure -1.08***   -0.622**  -1.23*** -1.56***   
Productive 
Expenditure Squared 0.07***   0.08***  0.07*** 0.07***   
Unproductive 
Expenditure -1.30*** -1.91***   -1.78*** -2.12***   
Unproductive 
Expenditure Squared 0.02 0.051***   0.045*** 0.046***   
Net Intergov. 
Revenue 0.05 -0.06 -0.65***   0.31**    
Surplus 0.49*** 0.43*** 1.14*** 0.33*                  
Surplus Squared -0.014** -0.01 -0.01 -0.001   
Constant 16.23*** 11.46*** 11.10***     13.45*** 13.36***   




From the results, I estimate the peak of a growth hill for total revenue where 
                     .  For the four equations the estimated growth maximizing 
level of revenue are respectively: 18.17, -7.88, 21.38, and 30.87.  Revenue raised to fund 
unproductive expenditures are growth diminishing.  For the states in the time period in 
the sample, increasing unproductive expenditures decreases growth at an increasing rate.  
Unproductive expenditure will be growth diminishing at any point in the sample.  The 
other three estimates give an idea as to where the ideal revenue to personal income ratio 
should be.  The higher point estimate for revenue funding surplus, suggests the negative 
impact state budget deficits have on the economy. 
 
Long-Run Effects and Measurement Error 
Annual data are particularly vulnerable to measurement error bias.  Reed and 
Rogers (2006)  estimate the roughly one-half of the annual variation in tax burden is due 
to factors other than tax policy.  According to Evans and Karras (1994), annual state-level 
income data are characterized by substantial serial correlation.  In order to help correct 
for these problems, I use multi-year interval data.  Measurement error is more likely to 
cancel out over longer time periods and serial correlation is less severe when 
observations are distanced further apart.  An additional advantage is that the variables 
have different calendar dates.  State’s fiscal years vary and the calendar year is utilized 
for unemployment and personal income. 
For a further robustness check, and to inquire over the long-run relationship between 
revenues, expenditures, and growth, I estimate the regression using 5 year intervals and 
incorporating a 5 year lag into the fiscal variables.  Consistent with Reed (2008), the data 
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now include observations for the years 1977-1981, 1982-1986, … , 2002-2006, for 300 
observations.  The estimated equation now is  
(17)                                  
 
                 . 
Another mathematically equivalent specification of the fiscal variables is  
(18)                       
 
   . 
Results are displayed in table 8.  The estimated coefficients continue to tell a similar 
story as those found in table 2.  Revenues spent on general expenditure appear to be too 
great.  If expenditures as a share of personal income increase by one percent over 5 
inclusive years, the growth rate is expected to decrease by -0.41%.  The long run effect of 
an increase in expenditure financed by general revenues is -0.15%.  However, own-
source revenues are preferential to federal government income with significance in the 
differenced (0.80%) and lagged (0.68%) variables.  Increasing the surplus is growth 
enhancing.  When state and local governments raise revenue a growth rate increase of 
0.33% is expected five years later.  If over five years revenues increased a growth rate 
rise of 0.49% is estimated.  Lowering expenditure to increase the surplus enhances 
growth, both in the long run (0.48%) and short run (0.90%). 
 Table 9 displays the estimates the long-run effects of disaggregated revenues and 
expenditures.  For convenience, only select columns are shown.
6
  Recall that because of 
perfect multicollinearity, each regression is the same.  I included the columns with the 
most statistically significant results.  Since there are only 300 observations, in contrast to 
the 1700 observation before, there are less statistically significant relationships.  In 
general, the coefficients are larger.  This could illustrate the lag in the effect that fiscal 
                                                          
6




activity has on economic growth.  It could also reflect correction for the biases mentioned 
previously.   
The most influential fiscal variable from the analysis displayed in tables 3 and 4, 
parks, recreation, and natural resources, now is statistically insignificant and has mixed 
signs.  Net Utilities have 12 significant fiscal trade-offs.  Increasing spending on utilities 
generally enhances growth.  The only directional change from table 3 is raising hospital 
spending by lowering utility spending has a negative insignificant relationship with 
growth.   
 








Unemployment Rate -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.40*** 
Δ Total Revenue 
 
-0.41*** 0.80** 0.49*** 
Lag Total Revenue 
 
-0.15** 0.68** 0.33*** 
Δ Total Expenditure -0.41*** 
 
-1.21*** -0.90*** 
Lag Total Expenditure -0.15** 
 
-0.83*** -0.48*** 
Δ Net Intergov. Revenue -0.80** -1.21*** 
 
-0.31 





Δ Surplus 0.49*** 0.90*** -0.31 
 
Lag Surplus 0.33*** 0.48*** -0.34 
 
Constant 8.47*** 8.47*** 8.47*** 8.47*** 




















Unemp. Rate -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.33*** 
Property Tax Δ -1.84* -0.05 1.15** -0.38 -0.71* 1.04** 0.36 
Lag -0.48 0.38 1.97*** -1.14 0.13 0.94 0.53 
Δ Sales Tax -2.37** -0.59 0.62 -0.91 -1.24** 0.50 -0.18 
Lag -0.97 -0.12 1.47** -1.64* -0.37 0.45 0.03 
Δ Ind. Inc. Tax -2.47** -0.68 0.52 -1.00 -1.34** 0.41 -0.27 
Lag -0.14 0.71 2.30** -0.81 0.46 1.27 0.86 
Δ Corp. Inc. Tax 
 
1.79 2.99** 1.46 1.13 2.88** 2.20* 
Lag   0.85 2.44* -0.66 0.61 1.42 1.00 
Δ Other Rev. -1.79 
 
1.20** -0.33 -0.66** 1.09* 0.41** 
Lag -0.85   1.59*** -1.52* -0.25 0.57 0.15 
Δ Net Utility 2.99** 1.20** 
 
1.53 1.86*** 0.11 0.79* 
Lag 2.44* 1.59***   3.11*** 1.84** 1.02* 1.44*** 
Δ Pol., Fire, & 
Corr. 
1.73 -0.06 -1.26 0.27 0.60 -1.14 -0.47 
Lag 2.78 1.92 0.33 3.44** 2.17 1.36 1.77 
Δ Transportation 1.42 -0.37 -1.57* -0.04 0.288 -1.46* -0.78 
Lag 0.30 -0.56 -2.15*** 0.96 -0.31 -1.12*** -0.71 
Δ High. Educ. 1.46 -0.33 -1.53 
 
0.33 -1.41 -0.74 
Lag -0.66 -1.52* -3.11***   -1.27 -2.08** -1.67** 
Δ Second. Educ. 1.49 -0.30 -1.50*** 0.03 0.36 -1.38*** -0.71 
Lag 0.77 -0.08 -1.67*** 1.43 0.16 -0.65 -0.23 
Δ Hospital 1.88 0.09 -1.11 0.41 0.75 -1.00 -0.32 
Lag 1.14 0.29 -1.30 1.81 0.54 -0.28 0.14 
Δ Parks, Rec., & 
Nat. Res. 
1.92 0.13 -1.07 0.46 0.79 -0.95 -0.28 
Lag -1.33 -2.18 -3.77 -0.66 -1.93 -2.75 -2.33 
Δ Welfare 1.13 -.66** -1.86*** -0.33 
 
-1.75*** -1.07*** 
Lag 0.61 -0.25 -1.84** 1.27   -0.81 -0.40 
Δ Other Exp. 1.14 -.65* -1.85** -0.32 0.01 -1.73** -1.06*** 
Lag -0.09 -.95** -2.54*** 0.57 -0.70 -1.51* -1.10** 
Δ Net Int. Rev. -2.88** -1.09* 0.11 -1.41 -1.75*** 
 
-0.68 
Lag -1.42 -0.57 1.02* -2.08** -0.81   -0.41 
Δ Surplus 2.20* 0.41** -0.79* 0.74 1.07*** -0.68 
 
Lag 1.00 0.15 -1.44*** 1.67** 0.40 -0.41   
Constant 8.81*** 8.81*** 8.81*** 8.81*** 8.81*** 8.81*** 8.81*** 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  The omitted variable is labeled above the column. 
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Welfare expenditure has 7 statistically significant fiscal trade-offs.  Raising 
welfare spending by taxes has a negative effect.  The differenced variables are significant 
while the lags are not.  The effects range from -0.71% (property tax) to 1.75% (net 
intergovernmental revenue).  Interestingly, corporate income tax has a positive, 
statistically insignificant coefficient.  Net utility is preferred over welfare spending.  The 
coefficients for differenced and lagged effects are 1.86% and 1.84%, respectively. 
  Higher education spending continues to display growth reduction qualities.  
Although the revenue coefficients are not as statistically significant as before, they are all 
still negative with the exception of the differenced corporate income tax coefficient.  
Lagged sales (-1.64%), other revenue (-1.52%), and net intergovernmental revenue         
(-2.08%) are significant.  Police, fire, and correction facilities now shows a strong 
(3.44%) lagged effect on growth if spending is allocated there rather than at net higher 
education. 
 The corporate income tax now has many significant relationships.  If revenues are 
raised by property taxes, sales taxes, or individual income taxes expected effects on 
growth for the differenced variables are -1.84%, -2.37%, and -2.47%, respectively.  This 
is consistent with the findings of Miller and Russek (1997) and Brown, Hayes and Taylor 
(2003).  On the expenditure side, net utilities has significant effects (2.99% and 2.44%), 




Section VI - Conclusion 
This paper has examined the effect of state and local revenues and expenditures 
on growth in real per capita personal income across 49 states and the District of 
Columbia for the years 1977 – 2010.  I investigated the issue under the framework of a 
constant government budget constraint: revenues equal expenditures plus surplus.   
Policy makers have more goals than simply to grow state personal income.  
Certain desirable aspects are not reflected in how high the personal income is.  Therefore, 
the results need to be understood in the framework of what they are intended for: the 
strict effect on growth in the economy. 
I found state and local government revenues to be too high.  If revenues are raised 
by one percent as a share of personal income and spent on general expenditure the growth 
rate of the economy is expected to shrink by -0.43%.  I then study which particular 
revenue sources and expenditures are growth reducing.   Spending on parks, recreation, 
and natural resources has the most pronounced effect.  Most fiscal tradeoffs are 
statistically significant and coefficients range from 1.11% (secondary education) to 
2.54% (hospitals and health) when spending on parks, etcetera decreases.  Agreeing with 
the later literature Brown, Hayes and Taylor (2003) and Miller and Russek (1997), I find 
that government subsidized education spending to be overfunded for the average state.  
This holds true for cotemporaneous and lagged effects.  The estimates range from an 
effect of -0.69% if property taxes increase to fund secondary education to a lagged effect 




 I find that increasing health and hospital spending net of charges magnifies 
growth.  The expected increases in the growth rate range from 0.53% (other revenue) to   
-2.54% (parks, etcetera).  Increasing the budget surplus increases growth.  These results 
hold true both in the cotemporaneous and long-run frameworks.  Effects range from 
0.41% (other revenue) to -2.30% (parks, etcetera).  Net utility expenditures improve 
growth when increased.  Under the long-run framework, the effects range from -0.79% 
(contemporaneous surplus) to 3.11% (lagged higher education).   
Welfare, unemployment compensation, and housing and community spending 
increases reduce growth.  The estimated effects range from -0.66% (other revenue) to 
1.86% (net utility).  There is evidence that health spending and increasing the surplus is 
preferred to welfare spending.  Assuming much of net utility expenditure is used in 
assistance to the needy, both health and utility assistance are more efficient avenues to 
help the poor than through direct welfare, unemployment compensation and housing and 
community spending. 
State and local governments underutilize the corporate income tax.  Relying more 
on a corporate income tax reduces market distortions caused by property taxes, individual 
income taxes, sales taxes, and federal tax sources.  The estimated increases in growth 
range from 1.84% (property tax) to 2.88% (net intergovernmental revenues). 
Starting at zero, increasing revenues to fund productive expenditures, surplus, or 
replace net intergovernmental revenue, growth increases.  Eventually, the growth rate 
starts to decrease as diminishing returns set in.  For spending on productive services, I 
estimate the optimal point to be between 18.17 and 30.87.  The average level of spending 
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for the sample is near this at 18.23% of total state personal income.  Yet recall that this 
includes spending on productive as well as unproductive expenditure.   
The goal of a government taxation and expenditure is to provide public goods that 
are underprovided by the private economy with minimal tax distortion.  As state and local 
government move from overprovided expenditures to more underprovided expenditures 
and implement optimal taxation, state economies will grow at higher rates.  
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Appendix 1: Fiscal Variable Series Construction 
All variables are multiplied by 100 and divided by personal income.  For further reading 
of variable definitions, refer to the Government Finance and Employment Classification 
Manual U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006). 
Total Revenue = property tax + sales tax + individual income tax + corporate income tax 
+ other revenue  
Property Tax = property tax 
Sales Tax = total sales and gross receipts tax + property sales tax – public utility tax 
Individual Income Tax = individual income tax 
Corporate Income Tax = corporate income tax 
Other Revenue = total revenue - (property tax + sales tax+ individual income tax + 
corporate income tax) – liquor stores expenditure – total general charges – total utility 
revenue - publicutilitytaxt15 
Net Intergovernmental Revenue = total intergovernmental revenue – total 
intergovernmental expenditure 
Net Utility = total utility expenditure + solid waste management direct expenditure + 
sewerage direct expenditure – transit utility expenditure – (public utility tax + sewerage 
charges + solid waste management charges + total utility revenue – transit utility 
revenue) 
Total Expenditure = net utility + police, fire, and corrections facilities + transportation + 
higher education + secondary education + hospital + parks recreation and natural 
resources + welfare + other expenditure 
Police, Fire, and Corrections Facilities = police and fire protection expenditure + total 
corrections expenditure 
Transportation = air transportation expenditure + total highways expenditure + water 
transportation expenditure + transit utility expenditure + parking expenditure - (air 
transportation charges + highways charges + water transportation charges + transit utility 
revenue + parking charges) 
Higher Education = total higher education expenditure – total higher education charges 




Hospital = health and hospitals expenditure - hospitals and health charges 
Parks Recreation and Natural Resource = parks and recreation expenditure + total 
natural resources expenditure - (parks and recreation charges + natural resources charges) 
Welfare = public welfare expenditure + unemployment compensation expenditure + 
housing community expenditure – housing and community charges 
Other Expenditure = total expenditure - (police and fire protection expenditure + total 
corrections expenditure + total higher education expenditure + elementary education 
expenditure + health and hospital expenditure + total natural resources expenditure + 
parks and recreation expenditure + public welfare expenditure + housing community 
expenditure + unemployment compensation expenditure – liquor stores expenditure – 
total utility revenue – sanitation expenditure – all other charges - (transit utility 
expenditure + air transportation expenditure + total highways expenditure + water 
transportation expenditure + parking expenditure) 




Appendix 2: Variables Averages by State 
Table 10: State and Local Revenues: 1977 - 2010 presented in order of growth rate of 
real per capita state personal income, lowest to highest. 








































Alaska 0.42 L 51.00 H 4.76 H 1.83 L 0.33 
 
2.92 H 




5.63 H 0.00 L 0.00 L 





























































































































































































































New Mexico 1.90 
 












0.00 L 0.00 L 
Florida 1.93 
 
















































































28.82 H 5.15 H 4.01 
 
0.00 L 0.00 L 
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Table 10: State and Local Revenues: 1977 - 2010 presented in order of growth rate of 
real per capita state personal income, lowest to highest. 








































































































New York 2.19 
 



































































0.00 L 0.19 L 














3.80 H 0.76 H 
Note: All numbers are percentages and averaged over the years covered. The first row presents 
the averages over all observations (states and time).  The second row is the coefficient of 
variation (the standard deviation of the column divided by the average of the column).  L means 
one of the lowest five states in this category (the exception of six for individual income tax). H 






Table 11: State and Local Revenues and Expenditures: 1977 - 2010 presented in order of 






































 Alaska 6.78 H 41.16 H 16.12 H 41.66 H 2.20 H 4.82 H 
Nevada 2.45 L 8.50 
 
2.86 L 16.14 
 
1.89 H 1.80 












































 Indiana 3.12 
 
5.92 L 3.77 
 




























































1.79 H 1.75 









































0.98 L 2.19 






14.12 L 1.17 
 
1.52 








0.87 L 2.33 










































 New Mexico 5.49 
 
15.20 H 7.62 H 22.00 H 1.75 
 
2.50 











 Florida 2.68 L 6.92 
 
2.94 L 14.15 L 1.65 
 
1.30 






















 Nebraska 3.40 
 


































































































































Table 11: State and Local Revenues and Expenditures: 1977 - 2010 presented in order of 
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21.89 H 1.76 H 1.77 











 Virginia 2.48 L 6.09 L 3.26 
 
13.30 L 1.26 
 
1.42 




















 New Hampshire 2.92 
 
6.24 L 3.09 L 13.49 L 1.03 L 1.25 

























 Delaware 10.86 H 14.98 H 10.83 H 26.91 H 3.47 H 5.12 H 
Note: All numbers are percentages and averaged over the years covered. The first row presents 
the averages over all observations (states and time).  The second row is the coefficient of 
variation (the standard deviation of the column divided by the average of the column).  L means 






Table 12: State and Local Expenditures: 1977 - 2010 presented in order of growth rate of real per 

















































 Alaska 1.79 H 7.38 H 1.04 H 1.89 H 5.12 H 1.35 H 16.07 H 
Nevada 0.82 
 
3.62 L 0.53 L 0.71 
 
2.08 L 0.14 
 
4.54 


























 Hawaii 1.51 
 














































































-0.21 L 3.86 
 Montana 1.05 
 
5.25 H 1.04 
 


























0.75 H 4.70 




















































West Virginia 1.09 
 



















0.50 H 4.98 

















0.28 L 4.22 
 
-0.12 L 4.30 







































2.22 L -0.20 L 3.31 





















2.27 L 0.32 
 
4.08 
















































 Wyoming 1.76 H 6.06 H 0.94 
 
1.26 H 2.37 
 
0.39 H 5.95 H 
Tennessee 1.01 
 
































-0.29 L 3.63 








4.97 H 0.28 
 
4.53 





























Table 12: State and Local Expenditures: 1977 - 2010 presented in order of growth rate of real per 





























0.24 L 3.09 
 
-0.21 L 4.48 








4.93 H 0.11 
 
5.60 H 




1.34 H 0.30 
 






















2.14 L -0.09 
 
2.93 L 























Hampshire 0.43 L 3.74 
 





 Connecticut 0.56 L 3.64 L 0.83 
 



























 Delaware 0.48 L 4.08 
 
2.02 H 0.46 
 
6.76 H 0.19 
 
4.33 
 Note: All numbers are percentages and averaged over the years covered. The first row presents 
the averages over all observations (states and time).  The second row is the coefficient of 
variation (the standard deviation of the column divided by the average of the column).  L means 
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